This paper addresses the issue of both domestic and cross border systemic risk for 8 countries in Southeast Asia (Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, The Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand). We use weekly data on individual bank stock prices from 2000 to 2005 to construct bank contagion measures based on the exponential weighted average correlations of the residuals of the market model. Our results show that average pair-wise correlations significantly differ among countries and that the probability that a specific shock extends to other banks is better predicted by asset risk indicators and market based risk measures, such as systematic risk, for cross country contagion. In contrast, for domestic contagion, liquidity risk indicators and bank opaqueness proxies perform better. Our findings suggest that whereas illiquidity, but not insolvency, is a major concern at the domestic level the opposite result holds for cross country contagion.
Introduction
The 1997 Asian financial crisis episode exposed the structural weaknesses of several East
Asian economies. Structural reforms were initiated as soon as the effects of the crisis subsided to strengthen institutions that failed to protect the economy from the undesirable effects of the crisis. Crucial to these economies are their banking institutions which were at the forefront of the crisis. Attempts to correct these structural weaknesses especially in the banking sector of East Asian economies are currently being implemented especially in the area of bank regulation and supervision. It is hoped that with these changes, their economies are better prepared should similar systemic shocks hit the region in this post-crisis period.
Prior to the Mexican and the Asian crises, structural adjustment problems in one economy remained within its borders and no one ever thought that contagion was a possibility and that it can occur with surprising speed. Immediately after the Asian crisis episode, the literature on systemic risk and contagion grew at a rapid pace as researchers and analysts scrambled to explain the nature of the events that lead to the massive system breakdown. Close to a decade has past and a large literature on the Asian crisis has deepened the understanding of the causes of the crisis and how it was propagated (See for example, Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) ). All the more in an increasingly integrated world, these studies have alerted policymakers that a crisis in one economy can be contagious. Thus, in the post-crisis era, the threat of systemic risk both at the regional level and within borders remains, if it has not increased. An area of research on contagion that has not been fully explored is concerned with systemic risk at the banking sector level in Asia. While banking sector systemic risk analysis is flourishing in advanced economies (See De Nicolo and Kwast (2002) or Demirgüç-Kunt et al (2006, forthcoming) and their hal-00918555, version 1 -13 Dec 2013 references), there are only a few studies on bank domestic contagion for the Asian region (See for example, Bystrom, (2004) ). This paper's task is to examine in detail, systemic risk in the banking sector of East Asia. In this study, the magnitude of banking sector systemic risk in each country is measured by the average correlation of bank equity returns, adjusted for market return movements (individual firm specific risk) using various techniques. 1 We focus on both domestic measures of potential systemic risk but also on cross-border indicators. Because our aim is to focus on the post-crisis period we consider the period 2000-2005.
Further, we build a framework to assess the link between individual bank correlations and systemic (domestic or cross border) risk. To complete the analysis, the study attempts to explore the determinants of significant individual correlations using a large set of firm specific variables based on both accounting and market data.
The paper is organized as follows. The second section briefly reviews the literature on systemic risk and discusses the issue as regards Southeast Asia. The third section outlines the method used by the study. The fourth section describes the data set and discusses the empirical results. The final section gives the conclusion.
Systemic risks in the East Asian region
Because of the complexity of the problem arising from systemic events, a variety of explanations have been put forth in an abundant literature. This can be gleaned from De Bandt and Hartmann (2000) who have conducted an extensive survey of systemic risk in general, 1 The dynamic conditional correlation model (DCC) of Engle (2002) and the rolling exponential weighted average correlations were the methods used in the estimation of the correlations. However because of computing constraints (missing observations for some banks in our sample and therefore incomplete series for DCC computations) and since the estimated correlations did not differ in terms of closeness to each other, the latter was chosen over the former.
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covering both theory and empirical work. 2 Accordingly, systemic risk can be defined broadly or narrowly, depending on whether it is the result of single (second round effects of shocks affect only one entity) or wide (second round effects of shocks affect many entities) systemic events.
Systemic risk arises when systemic events of either kind adversely affect a large number of institutions and prevent the financial system from performing normally.
The analysis of systemic risk in the empirical literature is conducted in several ways. For example, Schoenmaker (1996) makes use of autoregressive poisson regression on U.S. bank failure count data against macroeconomic variables and finds evidence of bank contagion. Worthington and Higgs (2004) use a multivariate GARCH model of the BEKK type and finds volatility spillovers in stock markets among some East Asian economies. Gropp and Vesala (2005) and Gropp and Moermann (2004) , using a sample of European banks, have successfully used extreme value theory in isolating contagion in market data.
The most popular method, especially in the analysis of the Asian crisis, is to measure contagion effects of an event affecting one or more entity on other entities. This may be done through correlation analysis -the method chosen by the present study -of either the equity returns or the exchange rates. One of the first articles on Asian crisis contagion is by Baig and Goldfajn (1998) who show elevated levels of exchange rate correlation during the crisis period.
They take this as an indicator of contagion. A particularly influential paper on contagion during the Asian crisis is by Forbes and Rigobon (2002) who showed that with appropriate adjustments to account for the increase in the volatility of variables during abnormal times, contagion cannot
be detected and what is apparent is the usual interdependence of variables that are also present during normal periods. Recently, Corsetti et al (2005) showed that Forbes and Rigobon's tests for contagion are too restrictive and lead to a bias for the hypothesis of no contagion. They suggest 2 One could notice that their work largely describes the extensive literature on bank systemic risk in Europe hal-00918555, version 1 -13 Dec 2013
caution in taking increased correlation as an indicator of contagion and propose to test contagion using correlations that have accounted for the influence of the data generating process from a simple factor model.
Attempts to explain the causes of the Asian crisis contagion itself have also been accomplished by researchers. It has been noted that prior to the crisis, the less developed economies embarked in financial and trade liberalization programs almost simultaneously in the early 1990s. Typically, these economies with wide savings investment gaps presented opportunities for investment in emerging market equities and encouraged cross border activities of developed country banks.
The explanation of contagion hinges heavily on the notion of a common lender country. This in fact lead to the 'twin crisis' sub-literature that attempts to disentangle the currency crisis from the banking crisis. Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) provide details on the common bank creditor as one of the transmission channels leading to the crisis aside from trade links and other liquidity channels. Sbracia and Zaghini (2001, 2003) expound on the role of both domestic and foreign banks in a country in the transmission of shocks during the Asian crisis. Complementing the results of Kaminsky and Reinhart, they list the stylized facts on the common lender channel that reflected a high degree of vulnerability of these economies. They then construct a vulnerability index for emerging market economies based on the common lender channel. hal-00918555, version 1 -13 Dec 2013
role of translating savings to productive investments are well defined. Emerging market banks play the same role but more importantly, because of the wide savings -investment gap, it makes them ideal channels of foreign funds to fill in this gap. Thus while cross border banking activity in Europe is increasing because of more integration among national banks (primarily because savings-investment channels are being integrated across countries), cross border activity in the Asian region has more to do with the infusion of scarce funds to supplement domestic resources.
Such cross border activities involves both foreign and domestic banks. 3 As domestic banks mature and grow into sophistication in the post crisis period, the dangers of domestic systemic risk will surely rise aside from cross border systemic risk arising from common lender channels.
Method
In this paper, systemic risk potential is measured by correlations of stock returns which have proven to be suitable indicators in previous studies (De Nicolo and Kwast (2002) To control for market movements and country specific factors we focus on the correlations of the residuals of a market model rather than on the correlations of the stock returns. Cross correlations between each pair of banks operating in the same country and cross correlations between each pair of banks operating in different countries are used to compute both domestic 3 One would suspect that the introduction of a common currency, the Euro, hastened this integration and growing interdependence among these European banks.
4 As a preliminary step we considered negative abnormal returns by estimating market models on moving estimation windows. A very low number of banks exhibit abnormal returns simultaneously (within a one week window) showing that unexpected shocks do not generally affect banks as a group (cluster effects). We also computed correlations on the basis of distance to defaults ( 
Measuring domestic and cross border potential systemic risk
Formally, let i(P) represent bank i of country P and R i(P) t the weekly stock return of this bank.
The market adjusted return r i(P) t is the residual at time t of equation 1:
(1)
estimated on the rolling one year window [t -51, t] and where RM Pt is the weekly market return for country P. Alternatively, we compute market adjusted returns using other specifications (e.g., residuals from a constant return model, from a two-index market model including the banking sector index, from a two-index GARCH model and standardised residuals from a two-index GARCH model). For simplicity, and because our aim is to focus on the determinants of comovements of returns rather than on their statistical properties we opted to use the standard single-index market model in the rest of our investigation. Nevertheless, we check that the residuals computed with the different methods have a similar profile except when they are standardised in which case they are much lower.
Denoting ρ t (i,j) as the moving exponentially weighted correlation evaluated at time t between r it and r jt , 6 the domestic mean correlation within country P, DOMC Pt , at time t is calculated as:
where N Pt is the number of (non redundant) domestic pair-wise correlations, at time t, within country P. Because we are concerned with how negative shocks affecting one bank might spread to other banks and not with the implications of positive shocks (unexpected increase in stock prices) we also compute correlations between simultaneously negative residuals solely. We further look at the correlations of sharp decreases in returns considering several thresholds (-3%
and -10%). The series of domestic mean correlations that can be computed with these different definitions are highly correlated. We therefore retain the standard definition involving all the residuals (positive and negative). Another issue that arises when computing correlations is that higher volatility on the market is often associated to higher correlation (Forbes and Rigobon (2002)). To check that our measures are not sensitive to changes in market volatility we also compute volatility adjusted correlations that account for varying volatility in the series of returns 7 . Both methods yield very close results and we therefore focus in the rest of the study on the standard correlation measure that is adjusted for changes in market volatility. 7 Volatility adjusted correlation at time t, ρ * ijt , as suggested by Forbes and Rigobon (1999) , is calculated as : σ is the whole sample [1994, 2005] variance of r it .
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Similarly, because our aim is to focus on market adjusted return co-movements for banks operating in different countries, we also calculate the cross border mean correlations, CBMC Pt , involving each bank i of country P with any other bank j of other countries P', (P' ≠ P):
where N' Pt is the number of cross border (non redundant) correlations for country P at time t.
We then test for the null of no domestic (respectively cross border) correlation for each country through the statistic:
where DOSC Pt is the standard deviation of domestic correlations: 8
The individual mean domestic (DOMC i(P) t ) and cross border (CBMC i(P) t ) correlations for bank i(P) are evaluated at time t as:
where N i(P) t (resp. N' i(P) t ) stands for the number of domestic (respectively cross border) correlations involving bank i(P) at time t.
8 Similarly, we define a statistic TCB Pt for the null of no cross border correlation for country P:
Statistical contribution of individual banks to country systemic risk
We assess the statistical contribution of a given bank i(P) to its country P domestic systemic risk by regressing each individual mean correlation involving bank i(P) on country P average domestic correlation: (7) is estimated only for sub-periods where the country average correlation DOMC Pt is positive and significant. 9 The statistical contribution of each bank to domestic systemic risk is, in this setting, given by the value and significance of the λ i coefficient. In this sense when, for a given bank the value of λ i is significantly greater than 1, we take this to mean that the bank overreacts in terms of co-movements of its stock price with other banks' stock prices and therefore in terms of contagion. In such a case, a bank's individual mean correlation is significantly higher than the country mean correlation.
Similarly, we measure the contribution of bank i(P) to cross border correlation of country P using the same method but by regressing individual bank cross border correlations CBMC i(P) t on country P average cross border correlation CBMC Pt :
where the actual contribution or sensitivity of each bank is given by the value and significance of the λ' i coefficient.
Econometric specification
Our aim is to investigate, within our sample of banks and countries, which type of banks are the most likely either to trigger systemic risk or to sharply react to events affecting other banks.
Under the contagion hypothesis a higher share of interbank activities in the balance sheet is 9 We required TDO Pt and TCB Pt to be greater than 2.
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assumed to increase the probability that a bank becomes illiquid and in turn spreads illiquidity among other banks in the industry. However, under the too-big-to-fail hypothesis this is less likely to happen to large banks which would immediately receive support from monetary and supervisory authorities. Under the asymmetric information hypothesis market participants are unable to discriminate among solvent and insolvent banks and particularly those with a high share of non-tradable and opaque loans in total assets. Such banks would therefore be more likely to suffer from a widespread panic within the banking industry. In order to investigate these hypotheses we build a multivariate regression framework based on the systemic risk potential measures and the individual contributions to average residual correlations we previously estimated.
Dependent variable
In our setting, domestic (respectively cross border) contribution of bank i to systemic risk is assumed to play a prominent role if λ i (respectively, λ' i ) is greater than 1. In this sense the correlations (co-movements) of market adjusted stock returns of a given bank with those of other banks are on average higher than the mean correlation. Therefore on the basis of the estimated values and standard deviations of these coefficients λ i and λ' i , we define two binary variables DP_DOM_2 i and DP_CB_2 i such that DP_DOM_2 i (respectively DP_CB_2 i ) equals 1 if we can reject the null "λ i ≤ 1" (respectively "λ' i ≤ 1") at the 2% level and 0 otherwise.
Alternatively, we also consider for the dependent variable the values taken by individual bank mean correlations, i.e., for each bank either the domestic mean correlation with every other domestic bank or the cross border mean correlation with every bank from other countries. Such an approach is much less constraining and allows to capture the determinants of bank stock comovements without imposing a criterion to discriminate sharp and moderate stock price reactions.
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Independent variables
To explain the probability of a relatively sharp reaction of bank i(P) with respect to the mean (domestic or cross border) correlation of country P we regress each of these two binary variables on a large set of accounting variables, capturing the size and the structure of bank balance sheets as well as bank risk and performance. We also consider market based risk indicators that are commonly used in the literature (see Table 1 ). The values taken by each variable are the mean values computed over the whole sample period. 
Model specification
As a first step, we consider the predictive power of each indicator by running probit regressions in which we introduce each explanatory variable separately. Then, on the basis of the results of this first step, within each category (size, capital adequacy, earnings, liquidity, etc.) we isolate the most significant variables (5% level). As a second step, we identify, within this restricted set of variables, the optimal set of explanatory variables by selecting them through a stepwise procedure. 10 We check for possible collinearity among the independent variables by running a Farrar -Glauber test for the null of no collinearity. When required, to deal with collinearity, we introduce an additional constraint of quasi-orthogonality 11 in the stepwise process. As a third step, we test for the stability of this optimal set of explanatory variables with regard to several factors such as bank type, its nationality, its domestic and world rankings. For this purpose, we introduce additional dummy variables in the estimations to test for the stability of the equation. 12 These dummy variables are presented in Table 2 . Table 4 ). Descriptive statistics of accounting ratios and market based risk and default risk indicators are given in Table 3 . Table 3 here 12 Assuming that the estimated model is (1) Prob{Y i = 1} = Φ(β 1 + β 2 X 2i + ... + β k X ki ), we test for stability by comparing the likelihood of this equation and the augmented model (2) which is:
where Di is the dummy variable for bank characteristics. We compute a LR statistic for the null of stability:
Under the null, LR is distributed as a χ 2 (k).
13 As mentioned in section 1, we focus on the post-crisis period but we also compute our correlation measures for the period 1996-1999. The results are available from the authors on request. On the basis of estimations performed following equations (7) and (8) we construct two binary variables DP_DOM_2 i and DB_CB_2 i . Recall that DP_DOM_2 i (respectively DP_CB_2 i ) equals 1 if bank i(P) overreacts or contributes to an increase in the domestic (respectively cross border) country (P) mean correlations during periods for which this country domestic (respectively cross border) correlations are significant. Table 5 shows the country distribution of these binary dependent variables and their cross distribution. One can note from the cross distribution that banks which highly contribute to domestic correlations are, on the whole, different from banks highly contributing to cross border correlations. 15 We also apply the same method using Merton Distance to Default measures instead of market-adjusted returns (results available on request). In this case mean correlations are generally higher and the values are closer for the different countries in our sample except Singapore and the Philippines which exhibit much lower average values. Tables 6 and 7 probit models presented in Tables 8 (domestic correlations) and 9 (cross border correlations) confirm these findings. Because there is a presumption of high collinearity between the stepwise selected regressors, we produce two estimates: first, no a priori condition is required with regard to collinearity among the selected variables; second, a low level of collinearity is required as mentioned above. The regressors that were pre-selected and introduced in our optimal models are shown at the bottom of Tables 8 and 9 along with their correlation matrix. Tables 8 and 9 here Tables 8-B and 9-B here 16 Non operating items = Non Operating Incomes (net profit on value adjusted of financial assets, share in net income of equity accounted affiliates…) -Non Operating Expenses (write downs of goodwills...) -Income Tax. 17 The Hosmer Lemeshow Test enables to test for the null of adequacy between theoretical and estimated probabilities of Y i = 1. To implement this test, one's has to group the N individuals of the sample in J groups on the basis of increasing estimated probabilities. Under the null, the HL statistic is distributed as a χ 2 (J-2). 18 We test for the stability of our last models through a LR test based on the comparison of the respective performances of two models:
Potential systemic risk measures

Results of Probit model
where D i is a dummy variable that enables us to account for the possible influence of the size of the bank (domestic or world ranking of assets), support of authorities, specialisation (commercial or investment bank), individual rating, country... (see Table 7 for D i definitions).
Under the null (H 0 : stability of coefficients {α, β, γ}), the LR statistic is distributed as a χ(2k) where k is the number of estimated coefficients in model 1.
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On the whole one or three variables survive the stepwise process defined above to optimally predict significant correlations. Default risk variables accounting for risk exposure, profitability and the amount of equity that serves as a cushion against failure have been rejected from the optimal models (capital adequacy variables and Z scores). For domestic correlations (Table 8) , the highest predictive power is obtained with the interactive variable capturing the extent of traditional intermediation activity M6_ NL_TEA_DEP_TA. Therefore, a higher proportion of deposits on the liability side of the balance sheet combined with a larger share of loans in total assets increases bank exposure or contribution to systemic risk (higher probability). For cross border correlations, when we account for collinearity among regressors, the highest predictive power is obtained with the market based systematic risk indicator (M6_ BETA) and to a lesser extent with the ratios of loan loss reserves to impaired loans (M6_LLR_IL) and loan loss provisions to gross loans (M6_LLP_GL). Therefore, for cross border spillover effects that can be captured through the linkages between bank stock returns, market participants seem to rely more on market risk indicators such as the beta and to a lesser extent on bank asset risk (asset quality)
as reflected by loan loss reserves or loan loss provisions. For cross border contagion the market does not seem to value liquidity risk, asset opaqueness and default risk (probability of failure). In contrast, at the domestic level, co-movements of market-adjusted returns are not driven by asset risk considerations but solely by illiquidity and asset opaqueness.
Conclusion
Previous studies on systemic risk in Southeast Asia focus on macroeconomic factors of bank contagion neglecting the information contained in bank stock prices. The aim of this paper is to propose a view based on a market model approach to assess the determinants of bank contagion at both the domestic and the cross border level in Southeast Asia. Our findings show that potential systemic risk measured as the correlation of the residuals of the market model significantly differs between two groups of countries. Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines,
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Singapore and Hong Kong, exhibit lower systemic risk than Korea, Thailand, and Taiwan. Our results also show that cross border contagion risk is better predicted by asset risk indicators whereas domestic contagion risk is better predicted by illiquidity and the extent of traditional intermediation activities (non tradable loans) which are opaque. Our findings suggest that whereas illiquidity , but not insolvency, is a major concern at the domestic level the opposite is true for cross-country contagion.
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